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This joint ICTD/UNRISD/SDC paper asks why governments of low-income 
countries do not raise more tax revenue, and explores options for 
increasing it.
Obstacles to tax collection in 
low income countries
The average low income country raises less 
than 20% of GDP in revenue compared to 
30-45% in OECD countries, and increasing 
the tax take is difficult. This is because:
• The structure of national economies in low 
income countries makes taxing difficult. It 
is easier to raise revenue from economies 
that are high income, urban, 
non-agricultural, and where the ratio of 
international trade to GDP is high.
• Effective tax systems depend on 
cooperation and coordination between 
revenue agencies and a wide range of 
other public and private actors. It is hard to 
make quick improvements to this complex 
organisational network.
• There are political constraints on the 
capacity of governments to raise revenue. 
Wealthy individuals and companies are 
able to influence tax policy formulation and 
administration in order to pay less than 
their ‘fair share’.
• Organisations that collect taxes engage in 
extensive ‘rent-taking’, cutting deals with 
taxpayers or using coercion to make 
money illegally for their own staff and for 
their political masters. This significantly 
reduces the amounts collected, and also 
brings tax collection into disrepute, 
decreasing overall willingness to pay.
• Governments use their ability to grant tax 
exemptions as a direct instrument of rule, 
selectively favouring some individuals and 
companies or penalising others, thereby 
securing support and political financing. 
This can result in huge tax losses.
• The design of a country’s political and 
government institutions can affect the tax 
take, increased capacity to tax being 
associated with higher concentration of tax 
raising and spending powers within a 
single authority. The degree of income and 
wealth inequality may also affect the tax 
take, although evidence for this is still 
inconclusive.
The scope to close revenue 
gaps
In addition to rent-taking and unjustified tax 
exemptions, other major causes of revenue 
gaps in low-income countries are evasion by 
transnational corporations, under-taxation of 
profits of mining companies, and under-
taxation of land and property. There may be 
some scope to address these through policy 
and administrative reform but there are no 
silver bullets:
• There is wide international consensus that 
the current system of taxing international 
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economic transactions needs reform. Of 
particular concern is tax evasion by 
transnational corporations that use 
transfer mispricing to relocate profits to 
places where they pay little or no tax. 
However tackling transnational tax 
avoidance requires sustained collective 
action by OECD and BRICS 
governments, and global reform efforts 
risk being undermined by individual 
countries pursuing competitive policies in 
order to maximise their own shares of tax 
revenue. Moreover, low income countries 
lack the capacity to challenge accounts 
presented by transnational companies 
and may find it hard to benefit from 
changes to the international tax system.
• Under-taxation of mining activit es by 
transnational companies is a major 
cause of low tax takes in many low 
income countries. There may be some 
scope to address this separately from 
more general reforms to the international 
tax system. 
• Land and property are currently grossly 
under-taxed in low-income countries. 
There should be good prospects for 
reform, supported by technology. 
However there are political and 
institutional obstacles including 
resistance from property owners, and a 
lack of interest from higher levels of 
government (property taxes being 
essentially local). International tax 
experts including the IMF and OECD 
have also given little attention to 
property tax. 
• Low income countries could adopt a 
package of tax administration reforms 
developed and implemented in OECD 
countries. They are largely driven by 
low-cost information and communication 
technologies, and could also work in low 
income countries. The reforms include a 
focus on larger taxpayers, cross checks on 
reliability of self-assessment, and measures 
to reduce direct personal interaction 
between tax collectors and taxpayers. 
Implications for policy 
makers
It is unrealistic to expect tax rates in low 
income countries to approach those in 
OECD countries, or to expect rapid results 
from specific tax reform measures. However 
constraints arising from economic structure 
and political and institutional context do not 
mean that efforts to improve tax policy and 
administration are not worthwhile: countries 
with similar incomes and economic 
structures can have very different tax takes. 
Tax is simultaneously a highly political and a 
highly technical issue. The most effective 
approach to increasing tax revenue may not 
be a frontal assault (for example on corrupt 
practices) to close the most obvious revenue 
gaps, but a more covert approach that 
combines highly technical changes (for 
example to the design of VAT) with political 
cunning. Potentially far reaching changes 
could be presented as technical measures to 
improve tax administration or broaden the 
tax base; and progress could be made by 
adopting incremental, indirect approaches 
that are appropriate to a specific context.
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